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Most of the books available in the “Baby Books” 
section of my local bookstore are sturdy, short board 
books printed on durable cardboard stock. This format 
is not surprising, for they are intended for the youngest 
of readers/viewers, those unlikely to understand that 
books are not intended as substitutes for weapons 
or teething rings. Browsing in that section recently, 
however, I was surprised by something else that so 
many of them had in common. A lot of them consisted 
merely of images of babies, some in cartoons, but 
mostly in colour photographs. Why were so many 
adults interested in providing pictures of babies for 
baby readers, and why would they think that a baby 
might want or should want to look at pictures of other 
babies? Is there an assumption that babies looking at 
these books see someone like themselves, or is it that 
they see the other babies in the pictures as significantly 
other? Or is it somehow both at the same time?
A body of psychological research concludes that 
even very young infants have a special interest in faces. 
In 1998, Francesca Simion and her colleagues found 
that “in newborns there is a preference for facelike 
patterns over nonfacelike patterns” (1399). In the 
same year, Alan Slater and his colleagues suggested 
that “newborn infants have been found to learn 
about individual faces very rapidly,” and that “the 
newborn infant can come into the world with some 
innately specified representation of faces” (266). More 
specifically, according to Jon Bartrip and his colleagues 
in 2001, “We can thus conclude that neonates have 
learnt something about their mother’s head or head and 
face during the first few days of life” (220)—although I 
assume here that it is not specifically a mother the baby 
identifies but perhaps a frequent caregiver. In either 
case, however, logic might then suggest that the images 
baby books offer should be those of the caregivers that 
interest infants. In offering, instead, images of infants 
like themselves, these baby books might be in the 
business of encouraging and developing a new form of 
egocentricity—a move away from a self-centred but not 
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very self-aware concern for needing nurturing to a new 
and more conscious awareness of someone like oneself 
as an appropriate centre of attention and deserving 
nurture. 
That, too, might accord with psychological  
research about the relationship between mirror  
images and self-awareness. According to Philippe 
Rochat and Tricia Striano in 2002, “Much research 
documents the emergence of behaviors by 14 to 18 
months that indicate explicit self-awareness in  
mirrors or any other reflecting surfaces” (35). Studies 
of mirror self-recognition (MSR) confirm that, “by 
4 months of age, infants showed signs of self–other 
discrimination in specular images” (Rochat and  
Striano 42), but intriguingly, a 2003 study by Mark 
Nielsen, Cheryl Dissanayake, and Yoshi Kashima  
also showed that “prior to the second year (i.e., before 
the onset of MSR) infants prefer to look at images 
depicting the faces of same-aged peers rather than 
images depicting their own faces” (214)—that is, 
at faces like the ones in these baby books. Rochat 
and Striano’s research supported their hypothesis 
“that 9-month-olds who begin to understand others 
as intentional agents of communication . . . would 
perceive the specular image of others as intentional 
and communicative, and, hence, as socially more 
engaging compared with the self” (42), whereas 
Nielsen, Dissanayake, and Kashima concluded that, 
while infants between four and nine months asked to 
look at mirror images of themselves and others “orient 
to the peer-image, . . .  investigation did not find this 
preference in infants aged from 9 to 24 months. Rather, 
at 18 and 24 months the infants oriented to the self-
image” (223). A further complication is the conclusion 
by Mary L. Courage and her colleagues in 2004 that 
“[c]hildren’s ability to identify themselves from an array 
of same age, same sex peers was later to develop than 
their ability to recognize their mirror images” (519). 
The business of self-recognition and its connections 
with, and difference from, recognition of others is 
complex—as complex, perhaps, as the relationship 
these baby books imply between the children in the 
images and the implied child viewer.
As André Vyt concluded in 2001, “Although visual 
self-recognition in the past two decades has become 
a standard and fruitful experimental paradigm for 
assessing self-awareness in the pre-verbal period, 
inferences from behaviour in mirror situations about 
the development of self-recognition and self-awareness 
must be made with caution” (185). Identifying one’s 
image does not necessarily mean that one has anything 
like a sense of oneself as a conscious entity.
Nevertheless, according to Nielsen and 
Dissanayake in 2004, “self-recognisors are endowed 
with a capacity for engaging in introspection and can 
thereby develop knowledge of their own mental and 
emotional states” (343), and Rochat and Striano claim 
that, while the self-discrimination they describe is 
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“primarily perceptual,” it is “the foundation from which 
children can eventually develop the conceptual and 
explicit sense of drawing on themselves expressed by 
the middle of the second year” (44). Courage, Edison, 
and Howe agree, referring to William James’s 1890 
work The Principles of Psychology:
This earlier developing sense of self-awareness 
is akin to what James . . . referred to as the self 
as subject of experience, or the “I” aspect of the 
self, a subjective, implicit sense of self that does 
not require the explicit or conscious idea of “me.” 
In this view, the development of the self is a 
continuous, incremental process and mirror self-
recognition is nothing more than a step along the 
pathway—“me” evolves from “I.”  (510)
In their provision of a variety of babies to look at and 
relate to and separate from a targeted baby reader/
viewer, then, these baby books might well assist in a 
complex developmental process whereby youngsters 
transfer their interest from others’ faces—including 
those of baby peers—to their own, and embark on a 
process of becoming self-conscious, of evolving first 
into an “I” and then into a “me.”
This last possibility reminds me of what the 
psychoanalytical theorist Jacques Lacan calls the mirror 
stage: that key moment in psychic development when 
a baby views its image in the mirror and understands 
that the image is in some sense itself, but also in 
another sense not itself. Something similar might 
happen when a baby looks at pictures of people like 
itself but not itself. Might these books operate as 
restagings or variations of the mirror stage?
For Lacan, the mirror stage marks the original 
recognition of one’s self as “me,” as one looks in the 
mirror and understands that what one sees there is 
in some sense oneself but also not oneself, and in 
being bounded and apparently complete, superior 
to oneself—what Lacan calls an “Ideal-I” (2) or ideal 
ego, a perfect version of oneself that one takes to be 
superior to one’s actual and apparently less unified 
and less complete embodied self. Seeing that more 
perfect image of oneself is an act of misrecognition, 
for Lacan a “méconnaissance that characterizes the 
ego in all its structures” (6) and that establishes the 
discord between the idealizing image in the mirror and 
the chaotic reality of one’s body that dominates one’s 
psychic life ever after. As Karen Coats says in “The 
Role of Love in the Development of the Self,” an essay 
on Lacan and children’s stories, “Whereas the image 
is whole and coherent, he [the baby] experiences his 
body as fragmented and disconnected. Whereas the 
image appears in control of itself, he feels as if his body 
escapes his control. . . . Thus the image functions as 
an imago, an ideal image that he will thereafter strive 
to achieve” (59). The baby strives from that point on 
to emulate that ideal image—constantly tries, and 
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constantly fails, to achieve the supposed ideal. From that point, we 
never manage to be what we imagine we ideally should be.
After the foundational moment of identifying oneself in one’s mirror 
image, the fantasy image of oneself as Ideal-I can be replaced in later 
stages of development by others whom one may want to emulate: by 
anyone a person sets up as an idealizing mirror for him- or herself, or 
by various role models in later life, for instance. The fantasy image may 
also be replaced by representations of others, which may well include 
the images of other babies in baby books. What are the implications if 
they do?
As photographs of actual children, many of these pictures represent 
what most adult viewers take to be the most realistic representations 
of babyhood possible, the way babies actually look. Nevertheless, 
the most obvious characteristic of these photographs is how idealized 
they are. As products of the marketplace, they represent currently 
powerful cultural ideas about a perfect, utopian babyhood, and 
so do the equally utopian cartoon images of babies in some of the 
other books. As Coats argues in her book about Lacan and children’s 
literature, Looking Glasses and Neverlands, “the way the books look 
is the way the world should look, and if your particular world does 
not, then it is not the ideal that has failed, but your enactment of 
it” (44). Furthermore, conventional assumptions about how young 
readers “identify” with the characters in books—how they understand 
themselves in relation to the characters—support the idea that babies 
do see themselves in such images. More accurately, perhaps, the 
implied readers/viewers of these books for beginners are in the process 
of learning how to identify, being invited by the books and by the ways 
in which adults interact with babies in the reading and viewing of 
them to see the images as versions of themselves.
As products of the 
marketplace, they 
represent currently 
powerful cultural 
ideas about a perfect, 
utopian babyhood . . . .
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In other words, they are learning to experience a 
version of the mirror stage: to move from an earlier 
state of total egocentricity (or perhaps, total lack of 
consciousness of self) to an awareness of others’ ideas 
about who or what one is. If the images do operate as 
versions of an Ideal-I, then, they represent one of the 
earlier means by which cultural and mercantile forces 
enter the lives of young readers/viewers and operate 
to shape their desires and their sense of themselves, in 
the interests of powerful cultural and economic forces 
apparently far removed from the state of babyhood. 
They help make babies into citizens and consumers.
What, then, is there for a baby to see and to aspire 
to in these pictures of babies? What sort of imago or 
Ideal-I do they establish?
First (and perhaps least obviously for already 
educated adult minds prepared to take these images 
for granted as simple and straightforward), these 
images communicate as all images do—by means of 
a complex system of established signs. They engage 
a wide range of conventions of visual depiction that 
must be learned before beginners can understand them 
as experienced viewers do and, consequently, see 
themselves as being like the readers/viewers the images 
imply. In order for that to happen, viewers need to 
realize, for instance, that the figure of a baby in Natural 
Baby: Eat, floating on a white background near a figure 
of a cookie the same size as its head, is not meant to 
be understood as actually being as large as the cookie; 
nor is the lamb accompanying a baby on a double-
paged spread in Sam Williams’s Buggy Buddies: Wiggly 
Toes smaller than the baby rather than just being 
further away from an implied viewer, as an established 
knowledge of the conventions of perspective might 
suggest (see fig. 1). And while the image of the lamb 
implies and makes most sense in terms of the standard 
conventions for representing perspective in visual art, 
the one of the cookie, while similarly using a white 
background, does not. It merely depicts objects of 
varying sizes at the same time without necessarily 
implying that they occupy the same space. Before 
arriving at something like the meaning of these images 
in the context of standard conventions, a viewer needs 
to understand that both these situations are possible 
and determine which one is in operation in any given 
picture.
Not only must viewers possess a wide range 
of competences in order to be able to understand 
these images in the conventional way, but those 
competences carry significant ideological implications. 
Even the most basic skills required to understand 
the conventional sense of a picture in a book are 
inherently ideological, in that making use of them not 
only allows one to understand that conventional sense, 
but in doing so also conveys ideas about normalcy. 
For instance, learning how to hold a book in the 
usual matter, so that what is meant to be up is in fact 
higher than what is intended to be down, allows one 
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to share with the other people in one’s life a sense of 
one’s orientation to things. It offers, in other words, 
an entry into a shared social space in which everyone 
agrees that, normally, heads are higher than feet. This 
is true not just physically, but symbolically: we are 
creatures whose heads play a more significant part in 
our understanding of who and what we are than do 
our other parts, and for whom what we think and feel 
defines us more centrally than what we stand on (or 
eliminate with).
In that shared space, we all agree that what we 
most significantly look like—what most identifies us 
as the individuals we are—is our faces, and then, 
secondly, the side of our bodies those faces appear 
on. The developmental researchers I referred to earlier 
all simply took it for granted that face recognition is 
what matters. None tried to test infants’ recognition 
of, say, their kneecaps or their toes. And it is hard to 
imagine a parent pointing to a picture of the back of 
a baby’s head or of its kneecap, and saying to a baby 
reader/viewer, as they would in response to a picture 
of a baby’s face, “Look! A baby! Just like you!” Not 
surprisingly, then, the vast majority of the pictures 
in these books are of babies viewed from what we 
identify as the front and, most often, from the neck 
up. In the mirror of these images, young viewers learn 
the relative insignificance of their backs in their ideas 
about who they are.
To find the baby in these pictures, one has to 
know how to distinguish between a figure and its 
ground. Some of the creators of these books seem 
to understand that inexperienced viewers might not 
yet know how to do that, and offer either pictures of 
figures against empty backgrounds or else very close-
up shots of babies’ heads with almost no background 
behind them. Almost always, also, the baby is front 
and centre, the most important and often the only thing 
(except the background) in these pictures. When other 
objects do appear, they tend to be smaller in size and 
otherwise less obviously attention-getting than the 
baby. The giant cookies in Natural Baby: Eat are an 
obvious exception.
Another exception occurs in Michel Blake’s book 
Baby’s Day, in which the focus is more on the objects 
babies use than on the babies using the objects. 
Nevertheless, the standard assumption that babies like 
or need to look at babies like themselves seems to 
require that, in order for viewers of this book to focus 
attention on other objects, the babies and backgrounds 
depicted have to be in what conventional pictorial 
dynamics would suggest is a less immediately attractive 
black and white than the brightly coloured objects they 
interact with (see fig. 2). As well, the babies are often 
located toward the edge of the pictures. Presumably, 
baby readers/viewers would otherwise not even notice 
the objects—or perhaps merely should not notice 
them if, as the concept of the mirror stage suggests, the 
books are teaching or confirming the importance of the 
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reader/viewer’s egocentricity.
There are, of course, many other baby books 
whose purpose is to focus attention, not on babies 
but on objects babies can look at: books such as Peter 
Linenthal’s Look Look! and Denise Lewis Patrick’s What 
Does Baby See? According to Coats, these books also 
play into an infant’s developing self-consciousness: 
“what matters is the emergent sense of the not-me” 
(Looking Glasses 43), of that which is separate and 
nameable and thus not oneself, and which thus helps 
to define the borders of what is oneself. In many of 
these books, furthermore, what is not oneself is often 
defined egocentrically, as what belongs to oneself. 
There are a number of books called something like 
Baby’s Things or Baby’s Toys or My Toys or I Love My 
Toys, and many others imply a similar proprietary 
relationship between child and objects simply by 
depicting objects in “baby” books, that is, books that 
babies and others are meant to understand belong to 
them. As a result, the development of self-awareness 
builds on a proprietary relationship between the self 
and what it separates itself from. What baby sees as 
separate is what baby owns.
But what happens, then, when what baby sees 
is a baby? In this case, the “not-me” objects that 
define “me” are also, somehow, “me.” “Herein,” 
says Coats, “lies the paradox of the mirror stage: The 
child has come to understand in the time of looking 
that representations of things make up the not-her, 
and yet here she is confronted with a representation 
that is both her and not-her. And if she can be split, 
that is, in two places at the same time, then she must 
not be whole in either place—she must be lacking” 
(Looking Glasses 47). Nevertheless, what is lacked is 
what she possesses—the other that is her and not her 
is, also, hers: her image. The sense of oneself as yet 
another object to be looked at then both diminishes 
one and makes one’s sense of self a proprietary 
one of mastery—oneself as a viewer and owner of 
objects, including oneself as the most prized and most 
important possession of all.
More typically, then, the babies in these books 
appear alone, without other objects, front and centre, 
and centrally important, the only or only truly attractive 
object—although even then they are depicted in ways 
that might confuse inexperienced viewers. In Richard 
Steckel and Michele Steckel’s My Teeth, for instance, 
convention would suggest that the two babies who 
appear each on one side of a double-page spread, 
are not in fact together but in two quite separate 
spaces, whereas the baby and the lamb that appear 
on a double-page spread in Buggy Buddies: Wiggly 
Toes occupy the same space (see fig. 1). In order to 
understand the difference between the solitude of each 
of the two babies in the first case and the togetherness 
of the baby and the lamb in the second, a baby reader/
viewer must have knowledge of both possibilities and 
use it to distinguish between them. In learning—mostly 
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through experience, I assume—to make such distinctions, young 
readers/viewers must develop a certain degree of analytic skill, most 
likely without even being aware of it. They must become observers 
who consider the implications of what they observe in order to make 
sense of it—something made most apparent in images like the ones 
in Roger Priddy’s Happy Baby Colors showing a baby surrounded 
by objects. These images are a form of puzzle: how do all these 
separate objects relate to each other? The solution is the largest word 
on each double-page spread, which of course the implied preliterate 
viewer cannot read: for a spread showing a swan, a glass of milk, 
and a sheep, for instance, the word “white” appears as the answer. 
Not only are these objects separate from oneself, they are related to 
one another, as oneself is separate from but related to them—and, in 
understanding their relationships, with mastery of them.
In observing in this way, babies inevitably begin to develop a 
less carefree and spontaneous kind of responsiveness—not just to 
pictures, I assume, but to the world around them in general. The 
reinforcement by pictures of this sort of analytic observation is cultural 
and ideological simply in that it is restricted to societies that produce 
pictures, that make them available for babies, and that allow the 
pictures to make use of a range of differing interpretive possibilities. 
Such societies inherently privilege an analytic frame of mind. 
Even when people other than babies appear in these pictures, 
they tend to be marginalized or even cut off, and the centrality of the 
centre is confirmed by the number of babies stared at adoringly by 
the adults who accompany them in many of the pictures. If there are 
adults in the picture, they usually seem to be there expressly to gaze 
lovingly at the babies (see fig. 3). The baby is the centre of attention—
the centre of its universe. Perhaps that is exactly what makes it so 
The sense of oneself 
as yet another object 
to be looked at then 
both diminishes one 
and makes one’s sense 
of self a proprietary 
one of mastery . . . .
Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 2.2 (2010) 21Perry Nodelman
ideal an Ideal-I.
To be viewed adoringly by its father or mother, the 
baby must be at some distance from the parent—the 
distance that allows appropriate viewing, that allows, 
for instance, a baby to look at and understand 
the images of babies in baby books. One cannot 
understand what a picture is showing if one’s nose is 
pressed up against it. These pictures of babies most 
obviously replicate the foundational experience of 
the mirror stage both in the ways in which the act 
of looking at them demands separation and some 
distance from their implied viewers and in how they 
replicate that separation in their distanced depictions 
of babies. In the mirror as in these pictures, the baby 
sees something like itself but also something outside 
that being like itself—an empty space, perhaps, but 
a space empty of the baby itself or full of something 
not the baby itself, an other it must then be isolated 
from, but also in the context of (and therefore related 
to), that other. The mirror stage prepares an infant for 
its entry into the next stage of development postulated 
by Lacan: the entry into the symbolic, an immersion 
in language and its grammar of relationships that ties 
an “I” to other words and to the concepts and people 
the words represent. Indeed, puzzle books like Happy 
Baby Colors, discussed above, encourage that entry. 
The relationship to an Ideal-I is the first of an ongoing 
network of complex relationships that both establish 
the centrality of one’s subjectivity and define its 
dependence, its standing, and its significance on forces 
outside itself.
The world the babies in the pictures occupy is an 
ideal one—a fit environment for an Ideal-I or a more 
perfect version of oneself to occupy. It is a bright, 
happy world: the shadows in it are minimal and the 
colours in it tend to be bright, cheery ones. Even when 
a picture depicts an unhappy moment, as does the 
one in Margaret Miller’s Baby Faces, accompanied 
by the text “boo hoo!”, it seems to imply more bright 
cheerfulness than distress, perhaps because of the 
warm pink background on which the text appears, 
perhaps because the image evokes a response to its 
subject’s vulnerable cuteness. I will say more about 
that later.
Meanwhile, while baths are shown frequently in 
these books, dirt is non-existent or invisible. The only 
diapers on view are clean ones. In the twenty or so 
books I looked at, there were very few babies whose 
clothing didn’t look brand new, and those, including 
an especially happy-seeming one in an apparently 
hand-me-down ill-fitting shirt, all occur in a book by 
Global Fund for Children called Global Babies (see 
fig. 4) that insists more centrally on the significant 
otherness of its infants than more typical books.
It is the lack of hardship or even much pain that 
makes these pictures into an ideological statement 
about what should, in fact, be understood as 
utopian—about what a baby’s world ought ideally to 
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be and what a baby ought ideally to be. For parents 
and other adults who look at books like these, the 
images establish or confirm an already-existing model 
of the sort of idealized environment they ought to 
create for their infants, an impossible ideal they must 
inevitably fail to reach and then need to feel guilty 
about. If Lacan is right about the mirror stage and if 
I am right about these books replicating it, then for 
infants these images take part in the construction of an 
inevitable and ongoing sense of failure and inadequacy 
that must be culturally or economically useful—a sense 
of lacking. The utopian nature of the utopia confirms 
the inadequacy of the reality from which it differs and, 
presumably, encourages adults to make their children’s 
lives more utopian—for instance, by spending money 
on things like these utopian books themselves. 
The world of these pictures is more perfect than 
real life, but it is also less than real life—smaller, less 
complete, less complicated. It is a basic pictorial 
competence to understand that the figures in these 
images—while much smaller than ourselves, with only 
two dimensions (no depth, no behind), and stuck in 
just one position, removed from the passage of time, 
and sometimes not even complete, with tops of heads 
or other parts sliced off—are in fact representations of 
people like us. But in learning that competence and 
accepting these lesser things as being in some sense 
what they are or what they ideally ought to be, viewers 
experience a diminishment, a sense of their ideal 
self as something smaller than what they already are, 
with the utopian delicacy of a miniature. While not 
surprising, it is telling that not a single baby in any of 
the pictures in all the books I considered has visible 
genitalia—not even the ones with no clothes on. The 
orderly world of the Ideal-I can be perfect simply 
because it is less messy, less complex, less uncertain 
about who one is or what one is or what one’s 
relationships with other things and people are. These 
books are, then, an invitation to accept a specific, 
more limited, and more readily socially recognizable 
and conformist subjectivity than the roiling sea 
of possibilities within us, to see something less as 
something more and more desirable. 
The diminished version of babyhood found in 
these books is one that many adults find appealing. 
Many of us like to think of children as endearing 
exactly because they are smaller, less complicated, less 
knowing and less uncertain, than we are ourselves—
and as I argue in The Hidden Adult, a central purpose 
of a lot of the literature adults provide for children is to 
persuade child readers that they are in fact, or ought to 
become, or to pretend to be exactly the less knowing, 
less complex creatures children’s books propose 
as identifiable with versions of ideal childhood: 
“children’s literature might be best characterized as that 
literature that works to colonize children by persuading 
them that they are as innocent and in need of adult 
control as adults would like them to believe” (163). We 
Figure 1: Buggy Buddies: Wiggly Toes. Illustrations © Sam Williams 2001. 
Text © Campbell Books 2001. Published 2001 by Campbell Books, a 
division of Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
Figure 2: Baby’s Day. Copyright © 2007 by Walker Books Ltd. Reproduced by 
permission of the publisher, Candlewick Press, Somerville, MA.
Figure 3: Welcome Song for Baby: A Lullaby for Newborns. 
Plush Studios/Blend Images/Getty Images
Figure 4: Global Babies. Text copyright © 2007 by The Global Fund for Children. 
Photograph copyright © 2007 Bryan & Cherry Alexander Photography. Used with 
permission by Charlesbridge Publishing, Inc.
Figure 5: Beep! Beep! Peekaboo! Copyright © Dorling Kindersley Ltd, 2009.
Figure 6: Marlene Dumas, Die Baba (The Baby), 1985, oil on canvas, 51 3/16 x 43 5/16 
Courtesy Galerie Paul Andriesse
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adults tend to reward children most when they most 
arouse in us what essayist Daniel Harris calls “maternal 
feelings for a mythical naivete. . . . Their cuteness 
suggests guilelessness, simplicity, a refreshing lack of 
affectation” (2–3). 
Cuteness. The babies in these pictures are, above all 
else, cute (see fig. 5). They ooze that peculiar quality 
we identify as cuteness. I suspect that few adults (or 
even well-trained children and babies) could deny that 
their first response to them isn’t something like “Oooh, 
isn’t that a cute baby!” So what is this thing called 
cute?
According to the philosopher of aesthetics John 
Morreall, cuteness originated as a survival mechanism 
for the young: “in the evolution of our mammalian 
ancestors, the recognition and appreciation of the 
specialness of the young had survival value for the 
species. And so certain features evolved in the young 
which got them noticed and appreciated; these 
features constitute cuteness” (39–40). Among those 
features, Morreal lists a “plump, rounded body shape 
. . . short, thick extremities . . . soft body surfaces 
which are pleasurable to touch [and] . . . behaviour 
indicating weakness and clumsiness” (40). For him, 
“Because babies’ thoughtlessness and inability to 
fend for themselves are seen as attractive rather than 
as an imposition on adults, we are much more likely 
to be patient with them, and that is essential in our 
willingness to spend the time we must spend in 
teaching them such skills as language” (42).
 But is cuteness merely a quality inherent in cute 
things, such as babies? The cultural theorist Sianne 
Ngai suggests that it is, in fact, a quality imposed 
on objects by means of a special way of looking 
at them: “a special kind of attention paid solely to 
an object’s appearance or ‘aspect’ (as opposed to 
its origin, identity, or function) accompanied by an 
appraisal based on the positive or negative feeling 
that its apperception elicits” (813). These feelings 
or values are then “‘objectified’ or projected back 
into the object, treated ‘as if’ they were one of the 
object’s own properties” (813). Cuteness, in other 
words, is a way of seeing things rather than a way of 
being. It does, though, require the presence of certain 
characteristics in the appearance of the objects it views 
as being cute: “the formal properties associated with 
cuteness—smallness, compactness, softness, simplicity, 
and pliancy—call forth specific affects: helplessness, 
pitifulness, and even despondency” (816).
As a result, viewing something or someone as 
cute might be an act of sadism or even violence. 
Ngai suggests that, “in its exaggerated passivity and 
vulnerability, the cute object is as often intended to 
excite a consumer’s sadistic desires for mastery and 
control as much as his or her desire to cuddle” (816). 
Harris agrees: “The process of conveying cuteness to 
the viewer disempowers its objects, forcing them into 
ridiculous situations and making them appear more 
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ignorant and vulnerable than they really are. . . .  
Although the gaze we turn on the cute thing seems 
maternal and solicitous, it is in actuality transformative 
and will stop at nothing to appease its hunger for 
expressing pity and big-heartedness, even at the cost of 
mutilating the object of its affections” (6). Even more 
negatively, he adds:
Far from being content with the helplessness of our 
young as we find them in their natural state, we 
take all kinds of artificial measures to dramatize 
this vulnerability even further by defacing them, 
embarrassing them, devitalizing them, depriving 
them of their selfhood, and converting them, with 
the help of the visual and sartorial tricks at our 
disposal, into disempowered objects, furry love 
balls quivering in soft fabrics as they lapse into 
withdrawal for the daily fix of TLC.  (9)
From this point of view, the pictures in baby books 
might well be one form of this defacement, and the 
babies in them models for the disempowered objects 
they work to make young human beings become.
There might, however, be some question about 
whether or not becoming cute is merely and only 
disempowering. In my quotations from their work 
to this point, Harris and Ngai have been describing 
cuteness from the viewpoint of its observer—as 
something we impose on the objects we view as 
being cute. They say nothing about the person being 
observed other than what the observer chooses to see 
of him or her. What happens if we try to understand 
how someone observed as cute might respond to it?
Harris’s assumption is that the observed cute one 
simply accepts the observation as true. I suspect it 
is more complicated than that. For one thing, the 
diminution of being cute, of accepting these images 
as forms of an ego ideal, might also be viewed as 
an expansion—a growing process. Coats insists that, 
“Because he is identifying with someone outside of 
himself, the child becomes more than what he was, 
that is, he develops” (“The Role” 58–59). While the 
development may be into a narrower, more cohesive, 
but more constrained sense of self, it nevertheless 
adds something that was not there before to what 
nevertheless continues. An Ideal-I is something to 
aspire toward and, possibly, to grow toward.
There is also a performative aspect to cuteness. 
Once a child is aware of the pleasure being cute 
gives adults—as, for instance, when an adult looks 
at a typical picture in a baby book and says, “Oh, 
look—a cute little baby, just like you!”—then the child 
understands the profit to be gained by appearing cute 
and acting, consciously or unconsciously, in ways 
that will satisfy the demand of others for cuteness. My 
own response to many of the pictures in the books 
I considered is often a sense that the babies in them 
realize how cute they are and are making as much 
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of it as they can. My sense that the image of a crying baby in Baby 
Faces accompanying the text “boo hoo!” is surprisingly cheerful might 
derive from my awareness of how very performative the theoretically 
sad face is, how very much it seems a stereotype of sadness that the 
child depicted appears to have learned to ape so well, how very 
unconvincing the sadness therefore is, and how very cute the image 
therefore is. 
The possibility that a baby might be in any way aware of how 
much it is performing a cuteness it does not actually feel completely 
committed to suggests, first, that its cute facade might be an 
unattainable Ideal-I and the cause of feelings of inadequacy, but, 
second, that it might instead or also represent a way for a child to gain 
back the power from others that the idea of its cuteness seems to rob 
it of. Indeed, Ngai speaks of “a crucial aspect of what we have come 
to call cuteness—the ability of the object to withstand the violence its 
very passivity seems to solicit” (830), and argues that “it is possible for 
cute objects to be helpless and aggressive at the same time. One could 
in fact argue that this paradoxical doubleness is embedded in the 
concept of the cute from the start” (823).
Assuming this is so, how might the cutified object or person fight 
back? Speaking of the demands made on a child by the adult world, 
Jean Baudrillard says:
Children are simultaneously required to constitute themselves 
as autonomous subjects, responsible, free and conscious, and to 
constitute themselves as submissive, inert, obedient, conforming 
objects. The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory 
demand he responds with a double strategy. To the demand of 
being an object, he opposes all the practices of disobedience, of 
. . . the pictures in 
baby books might well 
be one form of this 
defacement, and the 
babies in them models 
for the disempowered 
objects they work to 
make young human 
beings become. 
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revolt, of emancipation; in short, a total claim to 
subjecthood. To the demand of being a subject 
he opposes, just as obstinately and efficaciously, 
an object’s resistance, that is to say, exactly the 
opposite: childishness, hyperconformism, total 
dependence, passivity, idiocy.  (85)
Rethinking this shrewd comment in terms of the 
concept of cuteness, I arrive at this: to the demand of 
being cute, passive, helpless, a child rebels by being 
disobedient, but the disobedience inevitably expresses 
itself, for adult eyes, as childishness, inadequacy, 
cuteness—a cuteness that then represents a defiance 
of and opposition to the demands of responsible 
growth, development, and adulthood. In other words, 
cuteness becomes an act of rebellion against the 
reason and responsibility of growing up, which is 
why adults enforce it and enjoy it: it disempowers by 
insisting on its objects’ lack of power. Being cute in 
ways that adults admire might also then be a way of 
remaining free from the constraints and responsibilities 
of adulthood.
That possibility seems most obvious in 
circumstances in which children reveal their cuteness 
by trying unsuccessfully to behave like or dress like 
adults. I can read a picture of babies holding a spoon 
improperly, as in Natural Baby: Eat, as being cute 
because I am aware of a different and preferred way 
of holding a spoon—an adult, responsible, socially 
approved way. “Cute” here means mostly being 
triumphantly unsuccessful, endearingly clumsy or 
inadequate in one’s efforts to act like an adult.
Seeing such images as cute is, of course, the 
response of an adult—and there is no question but 
that much of what happens in these baby books is in 
fact there for adults to respond to. Still, a baby is being 
addressed—and the babies who respond to these books 
are not merely learning to be cute or to have their 
existing cuteness reinforced. They are also learning to 
observe cuteness themselves—to become the observers 
who then create it. 
Speaking of how many toys for children are cute 
baby dolls and baby animals, Harris says, “The child 
is thus taught not only to be cute in himself but to 
recognize and enjoy cuteness in others, to play the 
dual roles of actor and audience, cootchy-cooing as 
much as he is cootchy-cooed” (13). Books like the 
ones I am investigating here invite babies to think 
of themselves the way adults think of babies—as 
someone smaller and more vulnerable than their 
observing selves for whom they need to be responsible. 
Indeed, this is exactly the mechanism that the mirror 
stage introduces: the process of seeing oneself as 
deficiently dissimilar from an exterior image of oneself 
other—often older—people admire and reinforce. 
The baby as observer of its own babyhood has both 
accepted the inadequacy it observes and escaped its 
own inadequacy in the act of observing it.
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Baby books most obviously confirm that duality—
the need to be an active and responsible observer 
of one’s own observationally engendered cuteness, 
passivity, inadequacy—in the ways they invite baby 
readers/viewers to think of their relationships to the 
babies in the books they depict. For all their invitation 
to a mirroring form of self-regard, these are not actually 
pictures of oneself. In books like the two I looked at, 
both called Baby Faces (one by Miller, one by Harriet 
Ziefert), each page shows a baby—“just like you,” an 
adult reader/viewer might inform a child. But each 
baby is different from the others, different enough to 
imply a significant difference from oneself, for one 
cannot be exactly like all these unlike babies.
Indeed, the books insist on unlikeness, on 
difference. There are enough conventional clues—
colours of clothes, kinds of toys—to create a balance 
of boys and girls. The subjects of the photographs 
have been carefully selected to represent a spectrum 
of racial and ethnic groups—as indeed do the babies 
in almost all the books I looked at. In each of the 
books, there is at least one child representative of 
conventional ideas about the appearance of African, 
Asian, and indigenous groups of people, and three of 
the books locate their babies in differing places around 
the globe—most logically in the book called Global 
Babies, but also rather weirdly in two books by Steckel 
and Steckel, Go Baby (“How do kids around the world 
learn to move? JUST LIKE YOU!”) and My Teeth (“How 
do kids around the world show off their teeth? JUST 
LIKE YOU!”). It is instructive, furthermore, that a baby 
book I found in Germany, Klapp Mal Auf! Mein Körper, 
represents the same racial balances. But this book is in 
fact a translation of one originally published in English 
as All About Me! On the other hand, Alle meine 
Gefühle, an original German publication, appears to 
contain only white babies, perhaps suggesting that the 
multicultural focus on difference relates to ideological 
concerns about multicultural awareness of greater 
relevance in some markets than in others. 
Nevertheless, this insistence on representative 
differences seems to be absorbed by the overriding 
logic of the images as Ideal-I’s: despite their important 
differences from each other, these different babies are 
all similarly representative of you, the reading/viewing 
baby, and most importantly, the same as each other 
and the same as you: “JUST LIKE YOU!”
There is, then, an obvious message of racial and 
gender tolerance in all these books. In one way 
or another, they all say, we are all, in our different 
neighbourhoods and houses here and around the 
world, babies equally and together. In order to make 
this point, the pictures in Global Babies present their 
babies wearing costumes emblematic of their places—
costumes that represent stereotypes of the varying 
cultures represented rather than the internationally 
similar made-in-China clothing that most babies in 
those cultures surely nowadays wear most often (and 
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do in fact wear in My Teeth). These are not just random 
Peruvian or American aboriginal babies, but ones 
emblematic of their significant differences from each 
other. At times, in fact, these books seem to be in the 
process of teaching and insisting on an awareness of 
racial and ethnic differences in order then to deny their 
significance.
The book called Baby Buggies: Wiggly Toes reveals 
how the placement of oneself as similar to an Ideal-I 
marked by difference works by showing it at work 
internally, within the book itself. Each picture shows 
a baby and something else, a toy or an animal, that 
might equally be described by the words of the text; 
thus, both a baby and a bear have pink ears, and both 
a baby and a dog have brown eyes. This arrangement 
on the page sets up an intriguingly complex circuit of 
paradoxical considerations of sameness and difference. 
You, baby reader/viewer, are like the baby in the book. 
Therefore you are like the dog in the book because 
the baby and the dog have the same eyes, but you are 
clearly not a dog. Nevertheless, there is a connection 
between you and the dog, despite the obvious and 
obviously important difference that nevertheless 
does not prevent you from being in an important 
way (important enough for the text to single out) the 
same—and so on and so on.
That this pattern reveals the assumptions underlying 
all the depictions of babies of differing races and 
ethnicities becomes clear in a picture showing the two 
different possessors of “wiggly toes.” Unlike the other 
pictures, which include a baby and something clearly 
different, the other here is, strangely, another baby. 
But this other baby seems less pink and more brown, 
and so seems to represent a racial otherness—which 
is, apparently, equivalent to the other othernesses 
described elsewhere in the book.
Once more, the concept of an Ideal-I helps to 
account for the complexity of the relationship implied 
here. You are significantly different from what you see 
in the mirror—less than it and more than it—and you 
are significantly similar to it, an inferior or superior 
version of it in the process of trying to become like 
it and trying to be free of it. That might, in fact, help 
account for all the bewildering ways in which human 
beings relate to otherness—develop subjectivities 
constructed in relation to what we define as separate 
from, yet connected, to ourselves, become individuals 
in relation to other people like and unlike ourselves.
The comparisons between self and other found in 
Baby Buggies: Wiggly Toes appear also in two books 
by Vicky Ceelen, Baby! Baby! and Baby Nose to 
Baby Toes. Both contain images of babies (and parts 
of babies) set beside images of animals (and parts of 
animals). The point, once more, is how the two, while 
obviously different, are nevertheless similar; the way 
a baby looks as it makes “cranky, crying baby howls” 
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is a lot like a lion cub looks as it makes “grumpy grouchy lion cub 
growls” (n.pag.). I might read these books as uplifting and ecologically 
sound celebrations of our human connections with the animal world. 
But I resist doing so, primarily because these images are, once more, 
cute. They diminish animals by insisting that all of them, of whatever 
age, are equivalent not to human beings generally, but to immature 
babies specifically—creatures who need our care, not fellow and equal 
inhabits of our planet. In turn, then, the images diminish babies by 
insisting that, for all their supposed humanity, they are in fact similar 
to less evolved and more vulnerable species—including a number 
of domesticated and controlled household pets. These books, early 
precursors of a vast literature for children that invites them to see 
themselves in and as animals, imply a surprising degree of inadequacy 
for babies to ape and to aspire to.
Fortunately, and despite the sizeable number of these books and 
our apparently unquenchable thirst for images that depict infancy in 
that way, real babies are not in fact as inherently cute or always as cute 
as the ideologies we take for granted so universally insist. As evidence 
of that, I suggest the least cute picture of a baby of which I am aware: 
the broodingly malevolent infant in the painting by Marlene Dumas 
called Die Baba [The Baby] (see fig. 6). According to the Saatchi 
Gallery’s website, 
Bathed in sickly blue-yellow light, Marlene Dumas’s baby is almost 
repellent. Instead of an instant love affair, Dumas paints an alien 
encounter, the unnerving presence of an “other,” the realisation of 
an individual with a will and determination of his own. Marlene 
Dumas confronts the reality of motherhood, with all its natural and 
terrifying implications.  (Saatchi Gallery)
. . . real babies are not 
in fact as inherently 
cute or always as cute 
as the ideologies we 
take for granted so 
universally insist.
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A more interesting world than the one we actually live 
in might produce baby books about and for babies 
with pictures like this one.
The closest they actually get to doing so occurs 
in one small group of the books I have come across 
while working on this project—and unlike Die Baba, 
unfortunately, these books operate in ways that 
reaffirm and magnify the mirroring process rather 
than move past it. Two of these books, Picture Me 
Cuddly as a Bunny and Picture Me Cute as Can Bee, 
show photographs of babies in conventionally cute 
costumes, dressed up as animals, bees, and flowers. 
But these babies have no heads, and the die-cut hole 
that takes the place of their heads all the way through 
the book reveals a photograph of a baby’s face on the 
inside back cover—a photo viewers are instructed 
to remove and replace with one of their own child: 
“Baby is a cute as can be when you insert his or her 
photo inside the frame provided. Whether pictured as 
a fuzzy bunny or a busy bee, baby will be delighted to 
be part of the fun” (Cute as Can Bee back cover). Two 
other books, the German Alle meine Gefühle—which 
is noticeably about “alle meine gefühle” [all my 
feelings], not theirs but mine, not those of the babies 
in the book so much as those of its reader/viewer—and 
David Ellwand’s The Big Book of Beautiful Babies take 
this process even further. Each includes a portrait of 
its viewer in its gallery of babies by actually providing 
a mirror inside the book. The Big Book of Beautiful 
Babies offers this explanation:
From bold to bashful, bewildered to beautiful, 
this book is bursting with first expressions that 
will entrance both young and old alike. With 
its invitingly simple, rhythmic text and stunning 
images of adorable infants, readers will want to 
keep turning the pages from beginning to end. And 
on the last page, they will find a child-safe Mylar 
mirror and see the baby they know best.
This book is not so much staging the mirror as insisting 
on it. The real baby outside the book becomes the 
constrained one inside it; even Marlene Dumas’s 
scarily unconstrained infant would be diminished in 
these mirrors. These books are about “me,” the reader/
viewer—but “me” as adorable, othered, idealized, 
diminished, made cute, and carefully placed in 
context, “me” as what the mirror shows me.1
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Note
 1 In addition to the baby books discussed in this essay, see Beck and Croydon; Fitch; Patricelli; Reiser; Rescek; Sirett, Baby Talk; Sirett, Beep! Beep!; 
Sirett, Daddy Loves Me; Van Camp. 
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